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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

Supreme Court
No, 880311

KYLE MILLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Court of Appeals
NO. 880545-CA
14(b)

v.
LARRY D. LOFTHOUSE, D.D.S.

District Court
No. C87-6056

Defendant and Respondent.
000O000

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellant, Kyle Miller ("Plaintiff" herein)
respectfully

submits this Reply

Brief to respond

to the new

factual and legal issues raised by the Respondent's Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, was
not

entitled

to

summary

judgment

upon

the

motion

pleadings, together with affidavits, in the file.

made

and

The Defendant

attempts, in Respondent's Brief, to advance an altered standard
and to raise inaccurate statements of facts.

There are genuine

issues as to material fact appropriate for trial.

If the evidence on the record from Plaintiff, as is
argued by Defendant, was insufficient for the purpose of showing
a material question of fact concerning the medical malpractice of
Defendant,

for lack of adequate expert testimony,

the

court

below, under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
should have granted additional time to Plaintiff to submit such
expert testimony.
POINTS IN REPLY, AND ARGUMENT
The arguments of the Defendant, although persuasively
presented,

do not ring true because they

are slightly,

but

significantly skewed from the established legal standard and from
the evidence which was before the trial court.
THE LEGAL STANDARD.
On

page

10

of

inaccurately presumes that

Respondent's

Brief,

Defendant

lf

[s]ummary judgment is the time for

parties to establish that they can prove their case at trial."
Defendant then argues further that Plaintiff Miller had time to
submit, but failed to submit, expert evidence concerning the
alleged malpractice.
The time which Plaintiff had prior to the hearing is
not the foundation upon which support for an order for summary
judgment can be built.

Those arguments would be appropriate in

connection with a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for
2

failure to prosecute.

(The need for extra time is an issue,

however, as provided for by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The issue is argued in Appellant's Brief and referred

to below.)

Further, there is no admission, affidavit or other

evidence in the record concerning Plaintiff's use of time upon
which

such

an

Notwithstanding

issue
that

could

point,

be

judiciously

however,

Plaintiff

resolved.
respectfully

suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that it
is sometimes difficult to arrange for the testimony of experts
before discovery is complete.
The long-standing standard for a motion for summary
judgment is not "to establish that a case can be proven"; but
rather

is for the movant to show the court,

based upon the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the law,

as

applied to the established facts, leads to the conclusion that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See

Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care 740 P.2d. 262, at 263 (Utah
App.

1987);

Rule 56(c),

difference is important.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

The

A party opposing a motion to summary

judgment need not prove their case at the time of the summary

3

proceeding, but instead need only show that one or more material
questions of fact exist (or that for any other reason the moving
party is not entitled to the judgment).
THERE ARE MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF PACT.
A.

In Respondent's Brief,

Defendant attempts to

demonstrate by his recitation of facts that no question of
material fact exists.

Defendant, however, relies upon assertions

which are not fully established by the affidavits or other
evidence before the court.

Further, Defendant's own evidence

raises questions of fact.
An

example

relates

negligence after the injury.

to

the

issue

of

Defendant's

In paragraph 6 of Respondent's

Statement of Facts, Defendant states that Plaintiff was requested
to return in six (6) months, because numbness in the mouth region
" *** most often resolves spontaneously within six (6) months
***".

And, in paragraph 7 of that section of his brief, facts

are asserted

concerning a follow-up visit by Plaintiff to

Defendant and advice allegedly given by Dr. Lofthouse.

However,

there is no evidence in the record, by affidavit or otherwise, as
to the visits alleged or the reasons which Defendant may have
chosen for his alleged behavior.

Further, the Affidavit of

Dr. Israelsen, for Defendant, makes a subtly, but strikingly
different statement concerning his opinion regarding

4

such

numbness.

In paragraph 10 of his Affidavit,

Dr.

Israelsen

cautiously stated that numbness resulting from injury or trauma
to the lingual nerve
*** often repairs naturally with sensation
returning to the affected area within six (6)
months.
However, permanent numbness can
occur, which is considered a bad result, ***
Defendant's exaggeration in his brief, that such numbness most
often resolves itself, draws attention to the unresolved material
question of fact concerning Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant
negligently treated him after damaging the nerve.
Careful scrutiny of a key portion of Dr. Israelsen's
Affidavit reveals another failure to establish a material fact.
In paragraph 14e) of Defendant's Statement of Facts, Defendant
asserts that Dr. Israelsen formed the opinion that such numbness
" *** is a result that can occur without negligence on the part
of the dentist in the extraction of an impacted wisdom tooth;
***."

An investigation of the sworn statement by Dr. Israelsen,

in comparison with Defendant's quoted characterization indicates
that the witness took a more cautious approach.
of the Affidavit of Dr.

Israelsen,

See paragraph 10

pages 3 and 4,

where

Dr. Israelsen states:
*** permanent numbness can occur, which is
considered a bad result, but not a result that
in and of itself is attributable to any
negligence on the part of the dentist,
[emphasis supplied]
See also paragraph 12 of that Affidavit, on page 4.
5

The fact that it is possible for such numbness to occur
without negligence gives rise to a reasonable inference

(in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff) that it is at least equally
possible that it would occur as a result of negligence.

Under

scrutiny, the statement raises doubts, which must be construed in
favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

Robinson, supra.

at 263.
It is also important to observe that Dr. Israelsen's
carefully worded testimony does not clearly state a conclusion,
but rather acknowledges one of an apparent set of possibilities.
Further,
without

the acknowledgment
specific

reference

is in the abstract,
to Mr.

Miller's

and

is made

mouth;

because

Dr. Israelsen made no examination of Mr. Miller, or of records
concerning

the

condition

of Mr.

Miller's

mouth,

after

the

operation.
The
without

court below

reference

should

to opposing

have determined,

affidavits

by

therefore,

Plaintiff,

that

Defendant fciiled to carry its burden.
B.

Plaintiff, in Appellant's Brief, showed that the

evidence before the court established that questions of material
fact do exist.

The letter of Dr. Austin, at least when it is

reviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establishes

6

factual issues sufficient that the court below should have denied
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

See the argument on

pages 7-11 of Appellant's Brief.
Respondent's Brief only mentions that letter to argue
that Dr. Austin does not establish plaintiff's case.
did, or did not, is not the issue.

Whether it

It is elementary that a

summary proceeding is to determine if an issue of fact exists,
not to decide one.
ADDITIONAL TIME TO SECURE AND SUBMIT AFFIDAVITS.
If the letter and affidavit, considered in the light
most

favorable to Plaintiff,

were not sufficient to raise a

material question of fact; then they were at least sufficient
(together with counsel's request made in open court) to give
notice

that

such

testimony

was

obtainable.

There

is

no

requirement that a separate affidavit or written motion be filed
to raise the issue.

The court below, therefore, should have

granted Plaintiff additional time to present such an affidavit
under the provisions of Rule 56(f).
Defendant asserts and argues, concerning this issue,
that Plaintiff made no request for additional time.

See the

Statement of Facts in Respondent's Brief, paragraph 12.

It is to

be

noted,

however,

that

the

assertion

made

therein

is

inconsistent with the carefully sworn testimony of Defendant's
attorney.

A comparison of the affidavits of attorney Reed Brown
7

and attorney David Epperson, attached to the respective Briefs,
reveals no contradiction between them.

Mr. Epperson testified

clearly that no requests were made by Mr. Brown prior to the
hearing.

[Epperson Affidavit, paragraph 6.]

Mr. Brown stated

that the request for " *** an additional thirty

(30) days to

conduct discovery and/or otherwise obtain expert testimony in
opposition to the Affidavit submitted by Defendant ***" was made
at the hearing;

and that the request was discussed with the

Court, but denied.

[Brown Affidavit, paragraph 4.]

Plaintiff

submits that the trial court erred by refusing this request.
ROBINSON PRECEDENT.
It
strongly

is

upon

important

statements

to note
made by

opinion to establish his arguments.

that
the

the
court

Defendant
in the

relies

Robinson

As indicated in Appellant's

Brief, Plaintiff also finds value in that opinion.
It is of significant importance that, in Robinson, the
trial court granted additional time to the Plaintiff to obtain an
affidavit from an expert witness.

[Robinson, supra., P. 264.]

In this matter the affidavits and pleadings show that medical
expert testimony is available to establish Plaintiff's negligence
claims, and, thereby, a material question of fact.

However, if

the court below did not agree, Plaintiff should have been given
the same opportunity,

in equity, under law, and

pursuant to Rule 56(f), to do so.
8

specifically

It is significant, however, to note that the issues in
Robinson are to be distinguished from those in the case at bar.
Although there

is no substitute

for a careful review of the

opinion, the Court's conclusion reveals the Robinson context and
the relevant opinion of the Court:
We agree that trial courts should be
extremely cautious in granting summary
judgment for a defendant on the basis that
plaintiff has failed to secure expert
testimony to support a medical negligence
action. Chiero v» Chicago Osteopathic Hosp>,
[citation omitted].
But, appellant contends
that a plaintiff suing on a theory of res ipsa
loquitur is always is entitled to a trial on
the merits, so that summary judgment is always
inappropriate.
Such
an
argument
miscomprehends the purpose and application of
the doctrine,
as well as the pretrial
responsibilities of a plaintiff faced with a
summary judgment motion. In this regard, we
concur in the reasoning of the appellate court
quoted in Chiero:
We agree that if there is any
sound basis to do so, a trial court
should reject summary judgment in this
type of case. Where, however, the record
indicates that Plaintiff has [had] every
opportunity to establish his case and has
failed to demonstrate that he could show
negligent acts or omissions . . . [on the
part of the] defendant by expert medical
testimony, where the issue is clearly one
which cannot be determined by laymen
alone, summary judgment could be allowed.
[citations omitted].
[Robinson, Supra, at p. 267.]
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Plaintiff

submits

that

Miller

has

not

had

every

opportunity to establish or demonstrate to the trial court that
he could show negligent acts or omissions on the part of the
Defendant by expert medical testimony,
CONCLUSION
The Defendant did not carry his burden in relation to
his motion for summary judgment, in that he failed to establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment, based upon the facts before the court, as a
matter of law.

In fact, scrutiny of the evidence submitted by

the Defendant, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as is
required for the benefit of the opposing party in a motion for
summary judgment, indicates that questions of fact were raised,
by Defendant, alone.

Further, the evidence before the trial

court, including the opinion of Dr. Austin, established questions
of material fact.
If the trial court found that the submission of expert
testimony was insufficient, then, based upon the Affidavit of
Kyle Miller,

and the request of his counsel at the hearing,

additional time under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure should have been granted to Plaintiff to allow him an
opportunity to submit that expert testimony for consideration.
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The court, in either case, should not have granted the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Therefore, the said

judgment should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Q

day of May, 1989.

TAYLOR, /^NN]E^GA^^AJ3iy^&~l^W^

rneysy for Plaintiff/Appellant
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